Monkey Kind, Monkey See, Monkey Know

When monkeys help another monkey, they know it.

“When given the option either to drink juice from a tube themselves or to give the juice away to a neighbour, the test monkeys would mostly keep the drink. But when the choice was between giving the juice to the neighbour or neither monkey receiving it, the choosing monkey would frequently opt to give the drink to the other monkey,” according to an article at nature.com.

 (st-andrews.ac.uk)

(st-andrews.ac.uk)

The significant discovery was not the act itself, however. It was finding that an area of the brain responded only when a monkey not only gave the drink to another but also watched the neighbor drink it. Steve Chang and his colleagues from Duke University conducted the study reported in Nature Neuroscience in 2013.

Through the development of a part of the brain that experiences the reward of helping others, empathy-like processes may have been favoured during evolution in primates to allow altruistic behaviour. “This may have evolved originally to promote being nice to family, since they share genes, and later friends, for reciprocal benefits,” says Michael Platt,  a co-author of the paper.

For humans, these incentives for generosity have encouraged our capacity for kindness so much that we can be kind even t0 strangers—and even if they are out of sight. Unlike monkeys, we don’t need to witness a hungry member of our species eating our donation of food. It is enough that we can imagine it, and we choose to do that in part because it is pleasurable.

This holds true even though our remote giving has its limitations. Donations to organizations, for example, may not reach those we intend to reach, and even if the donations do get there, they may not prove very useful. But we donate anyway because the experience of generosity is so powerful.

We may sometimes look down on the act of giving to others simply because it feels good. Shouldn’t altruism be motivated more by duty and justice? But this study suggests that we have good reason to respect our pleasurable response. It is our ancient participation in one of evolution’s more benevolent survival strategies. .

 

Sam Harris and the Science of Morality

Morality and values are usually considered aspects of life that science can say nothing about. In The Moral Landscape (2010), Sam Harris argues the opposite.

Questions about values—about meaning, morality, and life’s larger purpose–are really questions about the well-being of conscious creatures. Values, therefore, translate into facts that can be scientifically understood….The more we understand ourselves at the level of the brain, the more we will see that there are right and wrong answers to questions of human value….A more detailed understanding of these truths [about well-being] will force us to draw clear distinctions between different ways of living in society with one another, judging some to be better or worse, more or less true to the facts, and more or less ethical.

For example, hundreds of thousands of school children are beaten by their teachers with wooden boards every year. Such corporal punishment is legal in 21 states. Is it wise—is it moral—“to subject little boys and girls to pain, terror, and public humiliation as a means of encouraging their cognitive and emotional development”? “The research indicates that corporal punishment is a disastrous practice, leading to more violence and social pathology.” The argument that corporal punishment is acceptable because it is based on religion and is an integral part of certain cultures does not outweigh the evidence of its destructive effects. It remains immoral.

paddling

(indiacurrentaffairs.org)

Harris sites other, similar cruelties, including female genital excision, human sacrifice, slavery, foot binding, and ceremonial rape. His judgment of them is resisted by secular academics who have long held that there is no absolute moral truth, that morality springs from culture, that therefore the bizarre practices of other cultures cannot be judged by our own standards. Harris’s reply is that “the mere endurance of a belief system or custom does not suggest that it is adaptive, much less wise.”

Critics praise The Moral Landscape for challenging our assumption that the factual nature of science has nothing in common with values and morals. Harris believes that the two are, in reality, interdependent: facts entail certain values, such as objectivity, while values are based on perceived facts about how people respond in certain situations. In this way, our growing knowledge of the brain can serve as the foundation for greater human well-being. Much as scientific advances in medicine have improved human health, so advancing knowledge about the brain can help people flourish.

But the book has been criticized harshly on several grounds. One is that basing morality on well-being is not as new as it sounds. Two hundred years ago, Jeremy Bentham proposed that “it is the greatest happiness of the greatest number that is the measure of right and wrong.” One weakness of basing morality on happiness this way is that justice takes a back seat; crimes require punishments even though those punishments may make the family of the criminal unhappy.

Moreover, critics say, Harris’s examples—corporal punishment, genital mutilation, etc—are extreme and straightforward instances of morally indefensible practices. But in a nuanced debate over whether a specific case of, for example, theft or adultery is justifiable, the well-being of the individuals may be too vague and inconsistent to serve as the basis for moral judgement.

well being cloud

Well-being: too many versions to serve as a foundation for morality.  (shutterstock.com)

For me, The Moral Landscape began feeling claustrophobic after a while. Harris belabors his critique of the boundary between facts and value but overlooks ways in which science already plays a part in morality and ethics. He might have cited, for example, the contributions of psychology to understanding such topics as happiness, the role of money in well-being, and the nature of power. He might have considered the role of science in moral decision-making whenever DNA is used to identify a criminal  and whenever economic data helps shape programs to reduce poverty.

As for the whole study of evolution, Harris dismisses it with the comment that moral behaviors that may have bestowed some survival benefits long ago make no contribution to our leading “deeply fulfilling lives” today. This makes no sense. Our capacities for cooperation and other social experiences, acquired over millennia, are for many people the very keys to a fulfilling life.

The relationship between science and morality is intricate, and understanding it more clearly is an important task for modern culture. Harris’s book is a step in that direction but is not the whole picture.